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| ***Kant’s Cosmopolitan Philosophy of History***  Kant did not produce a critique of historical reason. Scattered over numerous texts, however, he developed a multifaceted, fundamentally secular, but above all cosmopolitan philosophy of history. This philosophy of history is shaped by the leitmotif of Kant’s practical philosophy of freedom that manifests itself here in the form of a developmental history of freedom. Among the most important tasks of this philosophy of history is to read history as if it had meaning. Kant takes that meaning to consist, above all, in the establishment of a global order of law and peace whose warranty he sets out to demonstrate. Immediately after Kant, the philosophy of history flourished but without devaluing in any way Kant’s contribution – especially his critical notion of development.  *5.1 The Framework*  In the west, the writing of history began early with Herodotus and Thucydides (i.e., in the 5th century BCE). In contrast, the philosophy of history is very young even when almost all of its themes have antecedents in antiquity.  The origin of the expression “philosophy of history” is attributable to Voltaire, who took David Hume’s *Complete History of England* (1754-1762) as a model and wrote an *Essai sur l’histoire générale et sur les moeurs et l’esprit des Nations* (An *Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations*, 1756) as well as the later *Philosophie de l’histoire* (*Philosophy of History*, 1765). However, Voltaire did not develop a philosophical theory of history. His concern, rather, was with a general outline to history that attempted to explain history naturally in contrast to the theologian Jacques Bossuet (*Discours sur l’histoire universelle*/*Discourse on World History*, 1681) and Augustine ‘s decisive work (*De civitate Dei*/*City of God*), who both viewed history as the product of a divine plan. In addition, according to Voltaire, one is not to get lost in the plethora of details but must gain insight into a general idea of nations with the aid of an examination of the spirit, morals, and practices of important nations by means of which the world emerges as a universal, experiential realm for humanity.  Even before Voltaire’s *Philosophy of History*, Isaak Iselin from Basel published his philosophical conjectures *On the History of Humanity* (1764), in which one finds, in contrast to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (*Discourse on the Sciences and Art*), the central theme of historical development that dominated subsequently: that humanity is slowly liberated by means of virtue, the arts, and science from the dictates of instincts and appetites.  Another Swiss author, Jakob Wegelin, is more cautious. In his memoirs, *Sur la philosophie de l’histoire* (*On the Philosophy of History*, 1770-1776) and later in his *Letters on the Value of History* (1783), he is above all concerned with the (economic) theory and politics of historical writing. For example, he discussed the question of the reliability of sources and declares in a preliminary, sociological fashion (reminiscent of Herder’s observations) that the dominating ideas of peoples consist of their distinctive logic and morality. He declares only in passing that world history is in search of a peaceful, final stage in which humanity will realize its full capacities.  A decade following Iselin, the young Johann Gottfried Herder anonymously published his “physiognomic philosophy of history:” *This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity* (1774) in which he uncompromisingly and sharply dismisses the “Roman scornful lie” (79) that human history is “progressing toward light and prosperity” (Brummack/Bollacher 1994, 825). Unquestionably, Herder does speak of steps toward progress but with the recognition that they are achieved through loss so that the present is by no means superior to the past.  With this we have a sketch of the key elements of the framework of the discussion encountered by Kant: interest in a universal history; a secular philosophy of history rather than salvation history; the search for a natural explanation for historical events; speculations with respect to the aim and goal of history; assumption of a collective realization of human capacities; the notion of development, but also with philosophical skepticism with respect to development; and, not least, scientific-theoretical reflections on historiography.  Kant engages all of these aspects and collects them in a genuinely philosophical manner. In addition, he amplified the scientific theory of history by means of a hitherto unknown notion of a regulative idea of historical research. Completely new are secular conjectures with respect to the true origin of human history. In the 1790s, he added a certain love affair with the French Revolution, as himself the philosopher of two revolutions, in the form of a philosophical revolution of thought (the first *Critique*) and a moral revolution with respect to way of thinking or attitude (the second *Critique*) with the notion of “altruistic” but also not hazard-free “participation” in a revolution in support of republicanism (*Conflict of the Faculties*, VII 85). However, Kant’s primary interest in history is: to convince his contemporaries that one need not despair over the course taken by history. (Through his character Mephistopheles in *Faust*, Goethe seizes on this thought that in the end good arises out of bad, even evil, which one finds in Kant in the form of the development of a global order of law and peace.)  *5.2 The Texts*  There are two Kantian texts with “history” in their titles: the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* (1784) and *Conjectures on the Beginnings of the History of the Human Race* (1786). Both appear by their length to be unassuming. However, thematically they are extremely substantial not to mention well written.  The range of topics found in these two texts are addressed in at least four further writings: in the two-part *Review* (1785/1785) of Herders second work in the philosophy of history (*Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity*), in the first addendum to *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in the second *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) and in the last section of the second part of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).  There are still other passages relevant to the philosophy of history that are worthy of attention: for example, from the *Critique of Pure Reason* the last main part of the transcendental Doctrine of Method: “The History of Pure Reason;” from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Paragraph 83; and from *On the Proverbial Saying: "All is Very Well in Theory, but Not Good in Practice"* (1793), Part Three. Not least, Kant begins his philosophy of history with a cosmological theory: *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755). We will examine these texts individually:  *Idea*: the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* was published shortly after the *Critique of Pure Reason* and even prior to the *Groundwork* (1785) and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786). It is not merely Kant’s first, indeed not merely the first relevant, text concerned with the history of humanity. As well, in accordance with its title, its systematic construction, and its subordinate themes, it constitutes, Kant’s most important work on the philosophy of history (for this interpretation, see Höffe 2011 a).  According to its literary genre, the text is not a purely scientific treatise but an essay designed for a broad public. One reason for this could lie in the text’s modest philosophical claim. Kant does not offer a critique of historical reason so that the theme does not require the logic of a rational critique. Moreover, an objective modesty accompanies this particular genre. Kant is able only to offer a “guide” (*Idea*, VIII 17), which is a long way from veritable principles and far from the claim of his “system-” writings (i.e., his “metaphysical foundations” of the natural sciences as well as the doctrine of right/doctrine of virtue). To be sure the notion “universal” in the title suggests a hint of a philosophical principle (a pre- and over-positive interest) that would allow one to read into it a certain analogy to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*; namely, as a first attempt to apply systematically the new, transcendentally critical thought to a field, here history, and in this fashion to demonstrate the fecundity of the new way of thinking.  Although Kant writes an essay, this one is atypical. As if he wanted to emulate Spinoza’s *Ethics* (1677), Kant builds his text *more geometrico* (more geometrically). Namely, he arranges theorems that follow one another systematically and, then, are either explained or justified. According to this geometrical method, the very first theorem is a universal postulate (a kind of regulative idea) that is specified with respect to the human situation in the second theorem.  The silent, fundamental issue of the *Idea* is: How can a development of humanity be grounded philosophically? The follow-up question is: just what is progress, and what is its driving force?  The answer is announced in the agenda of the title as world-citizenship in two respects. In the first respect, world history leads, ultimately, to a legally formed coexistence among lawful states; the second respect has as its basis a subsequently articulated cosmopolitan (i.e., common to all mankind) interest.  *Herder Review*: In the search for natural causes for historical development, one should not, according to Kant, succumb to the mistake that he accuses Johann Gottfried Herder of committing in his two-part review of Herder’s *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity*. To be sure, Kant finds reason to praise Herder. He speaks of a “thoughtful achievement” and calls the author an “intellectually stimulating writer” with an “agile mind” (*Review*, VIII 55). However, the tenor of the review is devastating. It might be the consequence of Kant’s disappointment that his onetime student frustrates his new, critical, transcendental thought in that Kant criticizes that Herder’s unbridled poetry is substituted for fundamental philosophy.  According to Kant’s second, substance driven rebuke (see VIII 48), when it comes to the development of plants and animals, Herder does not speak of (conceptually comprehensible) seeds but of (mysterious) organic forces, and, when it comes to instincts, he doesn’t see a special natural force. In addition, he places too much emphasis on humanity’s walking upright in accounting for the development of the human species. Finally, in contrast to Herder’s claim, Kant does not view “the human race” and “species” as empty concepts (VIII 56).  According to the main rebuke, one can add that as a consequence of insufficient rigor, Herder succumbs to the criticized *quaternion terminorum* found in the paralogism chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 399 ff.): in other words, that at the decisive point of the argument the mediating concept has two meanings. Herder doesn’t distinguish between the “developmental step” of humanity “to a more perfect organization in another life” and the “developmental ladder” in the natural realm (*Review*, VIII 53). When it comes to the “developmental ladder,” nature leaves “the individual to its complete destruction” and retains “only the species.” As for the developmental step, one must “know whether the individual also will survive the destruction by humanity here on earth, which can be concluded perhaps out of moral or metaphysical grounds, but never on the basis of an analogy to perceptible productivity” (*ibid*.).  In the review of the second part of Herder’s work, Kant reproaches him for seeking “the origin of all culture ... not in humanity’s own capabilities but entirely external to it” (VIII 63). Kant then provides his own thesis of a unique kind of development. This is why he substitutes a singular (“Idea”) for Herder’s plural (“Ideas”) in Herder’s title, then attributes to this idea the precise meaning of an idea of reason and declares that the highest grade of culture can be “only the product of a national constitution according to the concepts of human legality” and “the actual goal of providence” (VIII 64) lies in that end.  *Conjectures on the Beginnings of the History of the Human Race*: Kant is not satisfied with the notion of development but investigates world history with respect to its ultimate, initial origin. This theme is already foreign to empirical, historical science because the presupposition of empirical science is missing: available historical sources: Kant knows that he is dependent for that reason on the imagination but, thanks to a leitmotif “anchored in experience” (*Beginnings*, VIII 110), he doesn’t get lost in capricious fictions.  In this manner, Kant concretely construes the agenda from the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship*, particularly the second theorem, as a “history of the first development of freedom from out of its originating capacity in the nature of humanity” (*Beginnings*, VIII 109). As leitmotif, he selects a “holy document,” the biblical account of creation following the creation of humanity (*Genesis* 2-6) by which he presents to the reader a dual message: On the one hand, it is possible to view the development of human capacities as compatible with the biblical account. On the other hand, on the basis of rational speculations, one can demonstrate a high degree of plausibility to this story. Methodologically, Kant employs the testing probe of reason to find convincing elements in the revelation. However, primacy is maintained by reason; no differently than later in *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*, revelation retains, to be sure, an important but merely ancillary function.  The first beginning (in *Genesis* called “paradise”), considered philosophically, is a state of effortless existence: Man in this state is entirely a natural being (as such, an animal) because he follows instincts exclusively. He lives in ignorance as well as innocence; hence, to that extent is happy, but he does not experience freedom. However, as soon as he attempts to make a free choice, he discovers “a capacity in himself to choose for himself a way of living unlike other animals who are constrained by a single way of life” (*Beginnings*, VIII 112).  This liberation from instinct offers both opportunity and risk. On the one hand, man throws himself open to a plethora of desired objects. On the other hand, he has no cultivated reason capable of guiding him to proper choices. Emancipation of humanity from the “immaturity of its natural condition to the status of freedom” is, therefore, “from the side of morality” a fall (into sin) which is followed by the punishment in the form of “a host of maladies unknown before” (VIII 115).  With his interpretation of paradise and the fall, Kant counters the “famous J.J. Rousseau” and brings “into harmony not only with themselves but also with reason the so frequently, incorrectly interpreted elements that appear to be in contradiction ...” (VIII 116). He distinguishes Rousseau’s earlier and later positions and agrees with the early Rousseau (the Rousseau of the two Discourses) that there is “an inescapable conflict” between culture and nature and that the transition from nature to culture is a fall. However, the fall, according to Kant, is necessary in order to bring about the development of human capacities and strengths as well as to make culture possible. Rousseau encourages, incorrectly, a return to nature but in contrast, later, he is correct when he (in his *Social Contract* and *Émile*) describes the difficult path of humanity to culture and to citizenship.  In the addendum to *Perpetual Peace*, Kant addresses the catch-word “providence” under the heading of “guarantee” and ascertains it to be a “deep wisdom of a higher ... predetermining cause of the course of the world” (*Perpetual Peace*, VIII). Alternatively though, one might rather speak of fate in the sense of the “necessitation by means of a law of what to us is an unknown cause” (VIII 360 f.). In the case of both interpretations, one is concerned with a purposefulness that possesses the epistemic status of an idea (i.e., a concept of reason) so that the corresponding natural teleology can be neither known nor accessed but can only be added to the phenomena to be explained. To be sure, this has a good reason: Eternal peace is guaranteed by “the great artist that is nature,” which here, in agreement with the conflict of the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship*, allows “harmony to arise by means of the discord of humankind – even against its will” (*Perpetual Peace*, VIII 360). Nonetheless, humanity has to help. The *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* (8th Theorem) speaks cautiously of an “interest of the heart that the enlightened individual ... cannot avoid to embrace the good” (*Idea*, VIII 28). *Perpetual Peace* elevates this “can” to “should:” Humankind has the duty to work for achievement of perpetual peace (see *Perpetual Peace*, VIII 368).  In the second *Conflict of the Faculties*, the “conflict of the philosophical faculty with law school,” Kant distinguishes among three options for representing history, all of which he rejects: that humankind is morally (a) deteriorating, (b) on the contrary, continually improving, or (c) stuck “in eternal stagnation” (*Conflict*, VII 81). He inquires with respect to the kind of experience one can appeal to decide the issue, but he does not answer with the notion of un-social sociality that is found in the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* and underscored in *Perpetual Peace*.  He appeals here far more to the already mentioned altruistic but, equally, not innocuous “participation” in the republican revolution. This “enthusiasm” demonstrates the “moral character” of humanity because the individual risks the danger of being accused of being a revolutionary (VII 85). Kant provides an example, then, of that sense of duty that combats inclination, which reminds us of the fact of reason (*Critique of Pure Reason*, §6, Comment). Just as in the case there (where moral consciousness is confirmed by the judgment that one, even when threatened with death, should refuse to give “false witness against an honest man” (V 30)), so here one speaks out for a republican constitution despite personal risk. | **五、康德世界主义的历史哲学**  康德不进行历史理性批判。然而，他零零散散地在许多文本中描绘了一个多彩的，重要的现世，但是尤为重要的是对世界主义的历史哲学的叙述。这个历史哲学被康德的自由的实践哲学的主调所支配，它在这儿证明了历史的自由发展的形式。在历史哲学的所有课题中最重要的课题是去理解历史就好像它富有意义一样。尤其重要的是，康德用这个意义去组建全球机构或者法律与和平并对此进行证明。后来，康德直接萌发出了历史哲学，但是在任何情况下都不要贬低康德的贡献——尤其是他的批判的发展概念。  **5.1结构（前提）**  在西方，对历史的写作最早开始于希罗多德（约公元前485-约公元前425，希腊历史学家）和修昔德底斯（大约公元前5世纪）。与此相反，历史哲学却是非常年轻的，即使它的大多数主题在古代已经被探讨过了。  “历史哲学”这一表达的起源可以归于伏尔泰，他把大卫·休谟的《英国史》（1754-1762）看作是模型并且写了一个《关于民族的礼貌和精神的世界性的历史随笔》（1765），而且后来又写了《历史哲学》（1765）。然而，伏尔泰并没有发展出有关历史哲学的理论。当然，他所关心的是用一个一般的轮廓去描述历史，即试图本真地解释历史以此去反对雅克·贝尼格尼的《关于世界历史的演讲》（1681）和奥古斯丁的决定性的著作《上帝之城》，因为后二者都把历史看作是神圣的天启的产物。此外，按照伏尔泰的观点，如果一个人没有迷失在繁杂的细节中，那么他在对精神、礼貌的考察的帮助下一定能够洞见到关于民族的普遍观点和凭借全世界范围内的人类的经验而来的重要民族的实践。  甚至在伏尔泰的《历史哲学》之前，来自巴塞尔的艾萨克·艾斯林出版了他的哲学推想《关于人类的历史》（1764），在书中人们发现，与让-雅克·卢梭的《论科学与艺术》相反，随后起统治作用的历史发展的中心主题是：人性通过美德、艺术和科学而从本能和欲望的命令中缓慢地被解放出来。  另一些瑞士的作者，如雅各布·韦格林，是非常谨慎的。在他的回忆录《论历史哲学》（1770-1776）和后来他的《 关于历史的价值的书信》（1783）中，他首先关注的是历史作品中的（经济的）理论和政治观点。例如，他讨论了原始资料的可靠性问题，并断言，在一个初步的和社会学的层面上（这使人想起了赫尔德的观点），人们的主导性观点在于他们独特的逻辑与道德。他只是附带地指出世界历史正在寻求一种和平的与最终的阶段，在这个阶段中，人性将会实现其完满的能力。  在艾斯林之后的十年中，年轻的约翰·哥特弗雷德·赫尔德匿名出版了他的“历史的相貌哲学”：《人性形成史的哲学》，在这本书中，他坚决并尖锐地消解了“罗马人的轻蔑的谎言”，即认为人类历史是“向着光明和繁荣前进的”。毫无疑问的是，赫尔德确实提到了朝向进步的步伐，但是这些前进步伐却是通过失去而实现的，因此现在绝不会优于过去。  通过这些内容，我们对康德的讨论框架中的关键要素有了一个大致的把握：在一个普遍的历史中的兴趣；一个现世的历史哲学而不是拯救哲学；寻求对历史事件的一种自然的解释；对历史的目的和目标的思考；对人类能力的一种共同实现的假设；发展的概念，但是也是关于发展的哲学怀疑论；并且，相当重要的是对历史编纂的科学的-推想的反思。  康德思考了所有的这些内容并将其放置在一种真正的哲学的方式中。并且，他通过一个到目前为止未知的关于历史研究的一种调节性想法的概念去加强历史的科学性理论。关于人类历史的真正起源的现世推测是全新的。在十八世纪九十年代，他作为以思维（第一批判）的哲学革命和关于对“利他主义”概念的思考或态度（第二批判）的道德的革命这两大革命的哲学家对法国大革命感兴趣，但却并没有无风险地“参与”到对共和主义（《学科之争》，VII 85）支持的革命中去。然而，康德的主要兴趣是在历史领域：去说服他的同时代人不要对历史发展的进程感到绝望。（歌德通过他在《浮士德》中的诱惑者这一角色去抓住这一思想，即否极泰来，甚至罪恶，人们在康德的关于全球法律的秩序与和平的发展中也可发现。）  **5.2文本**  康德的文本中，有两个在其题目中带有“历史”这一概念：《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》（1784）及《人类历史揣测的开端》（1786）。这两个题目就其长度来说都显得不招摇。然而，在主题方面，它们都是极为重要的，更不用说它们都写得很好。  这两个文本中的主题的范围至少在四个作品中得到了进一步的发展：在对赫尔德的第二部关于历史哲学的著作（《人类历史哲学的理念》）所做的上下两部《书评》（1785、1785）中，在《论永久和平》（1795）的第一个附录中，在《学科之争》的第二部分（1798）中以及在《实用人类学》（1798）的第二部分的最后一章节中。  其他的一些文章中所涉及的历史哲学，这也值得我们去关注：例如，《纯粹理性批判》最后一个主要部分，即先验方法论部分：“纯粹理性的历史”；《判断力批判》第83节；和《论俗语》：“这在理论上可能是正确的，但不适用于实践”（1793）的第三部分。尤其重要的是，康德以宇宙论的原理开始他的历史哲学：《一般自然史与天体理论》。我们将分别仔细审查这些文本。  观点：《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》在《纯粹理性批判》甚至的开端《奠基》（1785）和《自然科学的形而上学奠基》（1786）后不久就出版了。这不只是康德第一次去探讨有关人类历史的文本，也的确不只是康德第一次探讨相关问题的文本。而且，康德关于历史哲学的最重要的工作包括与它相一致的主题、有系统的建筑术和它的附属主题。（关于此解释，见赫费2011a）。  根据它的写作上的风格，这个文本不是纯粹的科学论述，而是为广大公众设计的随笔。这其中一个原因在于文本适度的哲学要求。康德没有提供历史理性批判以至于这个主题不需要理性批判的逻辑。此外，一种客观的谦逊陪伴着这种特殊的风格。康德只能提供一个“指导”（Idea，VIII 17），这距离真正的原则还有一条很长的道路，并且与他的“系统-”作品中的结论（也就是说，他的自然科学的“形而上学奠基”以及权利的教条或美德的教条）之间还有一段很长的距离。的确，题目中的“普遍的”这一概念给出了一种哲学原则（一种前肯定的和超肯定的利益）的暗示，能够使得人们将其解读为一种与《自然科学的形而上学奠基》相类似的含义；也就是说，它作为第一次系统地将新的、先验的批判思想应用到一种领域（这里指历史）的尝试，并且以此来证明这种新的思考方式的有效性。  尽管康德写了一篇文章，但这篇文章却是非典型的。似乎是想要赶上斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》（1677），康德将他的文本写作地更加几何化。也就是说，他系统地一个接一个地排列了许多数学命题，并随后对它们进行了解释或证明。根据他的几何学方法，第一个定理是一种普遍的假设（一种调整性的想法），这个假设是依据人们在第二定理中的位置而确定的。  《理念》中的沉寂的、基础性的问题是：人类的一种发展如何从哲学上寻找基础？接下来的问题是：什么是进步？它的驱动力又是什么？  在题目的议题中，问题的答案在两个方面被宣布为世界-公民。第一个方面，世界历史最终会通向一种法定国家之间的合法形成的共存状态；第二个方面随后在基础上具有一个连接性的、世界性的（即所有人类所共有的）利益。  《关于赫尔德的书评》：根据康德的看法，一个人在探寻历史发展的自然原因时，不应该屈从于他在其关于赫尔德的《人类历史哲学的理念》所做的书评中指控赫尔德所犯的错误。诚然，康德找到了称赞赫尔德的理由。他提到了一种“思想性的成就”并将作者称为一名具有“活跃思维”的“在知性上具有刺激性的作者”（《书评》，VIII 55）。然而，这部书评的主旨仍旧是摧毁性的。这可能是康德对其之前的学生失望的结果，这名学生使康德的新的、批判的、先验的思想受到了挫折，而正是在这种思想中康德批判了赫尔德的不受约束的诗歌取代了根本的哲学。  根据康德的第二个依据主旨所做的责难（VIII 48），当谈到星球与动物的发展时，赫尔德没有提到(从概念上是可以理解的)种子但却提到了（神秘的）有机力量，并且当谈到本能时，赫尔德没有看到一种特别的自然力量。另外，他对人类的直立行走在人类物种发展中的重要性予以了过多的强调。最终，与赫尔德的主张相反，康德并没有将“人类种族”或“物种”视作空洞的概念。（VIII 56）  依据这个主要的指责，人们可以补充说，作为严密性不足的后果，赫尔德屈从于《纯粹理性批判》里的悖论章节中所发现的那种受到批评的四词谬误：换句话说，在论争的决定性点上，调节性的概念具有双重含义。赫尔德没有区分人类“向着另一种生活中的一种更加完善的组织”的“发展阶段”与自然领域中的“发展阶梯”（《书评》，VIII 53）。当提到“发展阶梯”时，自然留下“个体去达到其彻底的毁灭”而保持的“仅仅是物种”。至于发展阶段，人们必须“知道个体是否也将会从由地球上的人类所造成的毁灭中存活下来，这或许是出于道德的或形而上学的基础而得出的结论，而绝不会是以与可感知的生产力相类似的东西为基础。”（同上）  依照赫尔德作品的第二部分中的观点，康德斥责赫尔德自寻求“所有文化的起源时……不是从人类自身的能力而是完全从外在于人类的方面来着手”（VIII 63）。随后康德对他自己的文章进行了一些独特的发展。这就是为什么他用单数（“Idea”）代替了赫尔德在其题目中使用的复数（“Ideas”），之后将这个理念作为理性理念的精确含义，并宣称，“根据人类合法性的概念”，文化的最高等级“只能是一个国家级体制的产物”，而且“天意的真实目标”（VIII 64）就在最后出现。  《关于人类种族史开端的推想》：康德对发展的概念并不满意，而是探究了世界历史的根本的、最终的起源。这个主题早已与实证的、历史的科学无关了，因为实证科学的假定已经不见了：可获得的历史性材料。康德知道他依赖于想象之上的理性，但是由于坚持“扎根于经验中”这一主旨（《开端》，VIII 110），他并没有迷失于反复无常的小说中。  用这种方式，康德从《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》中具体分析了一些议题，尤其是从第二定理，将其分析为一种“自由的首次发展的历史，这种自由来自人类本性中的原初能力”（《开端》，VIII 109）。作为主旨，康德挑选了一种“神圣的文献”，圣经中对创造的解释遵循人类的创造，经由此，他向读者呈现了双重信息：一方面，将人类能力的发展视作与圣经的解释相共存是有可能的；另一方面，在理性推测的基础上，人们能够证明这个故事的高度合理性。从方法论上来看，康德使用了理性的测试探针来发现这个启示中的令人信服的内容。然而，理性仍旧处于首要地位；与之后的《纯粹理性界限内的宗教》一样，启示诚然具有一种重要的但却仅仅只是辅助的功能。  第一个开端（在《创世纪》中被称为“天堂”）从哲学上考虑是一种毫不费力的存在的一种状态：人类在这个状态中是一种完全自然的存在（本身也是一种动物），因为他只遵循本能。他生活在无知与天真之中，因此，就这个程度而言人类是幸福的，但是他并没有体会到自由。然而，一旦他试图去做一个自由的选择，他就会发现“他自身之内的一种为他自己选择一种生活方式的能力，这种生活方式不同于其他动物，它们都被一种单一的生活方式所约束”（《开端》，VIII 112）。  从本能中解放出来既提供了机遇也提供了挑战。一方面，人类将自身投向大量的欲望对象之中；另一方面，人类并没有能够指导他做出合适选择的那种被培养出的理性。因此，人类从“他的自然状态的不成熟向自由状态”的解放就是“从道德的一边”向（罪恶）的下降，随之而来的就是以“一系列从前所未知的弊病”形式而出现的惩罚（VIII 115）。  从其对天堂与下落的解释中，康德反驳了“著名的J.J.卢梭”并带来了“与他们自身以及与理性之间的和谐，这错误地解决了出现在悖论中的原理 ” 。康德区分了卢梭早期和晚期的立场，并同意早期卢梭（两次演讲时期的卢梭）的看法，即在文化与自然之间存在着“不可避免的冲突”，从自然向文化的过渡是一种下降。然而，根据康德的看法，为了带来人类能力与力量的发展并使得文化得以可能，这种下降是必要的。卢梭错误地鼓励一种向自然的回归，但是相反，之后当他描述人类走向文化与公民的困难道路时，他却是正确的。  在《论永久的和平》的附录中，康德用“天意”这个流行的单词放在“保证”的开头，并且康德确定它将成为一个“关于对世界进程的更高的原因预测的深刻智慧”（《论永久和平》，VIII ）对于解释的原因尽管要二选一：一个也许宁愿从“凭借对我们来说未知原因的规律的强迫”（VIII 360 f.）的意义上谈及命运。另一个关心目的性，即发展理念（换言之，理性的概念）的认识地位以至于相应的自然目的论不被熟知或不被允可而仅仅被附加的现象所解释。可以确定的是，这包含一个好的理由：永久的和平被“最好的艺术即自然”所保证，在这儿，对《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》争论达成了一致意见，它允许“凭借人们的不和甚至违背人们的意志而让和谐产生”（《论永久和平》，VIII 360）。虽然如此，但是，人性需要帮助。《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》（第8个定理）谨慎地说明“心的兴趣即有见识的个人……不能避免信奉上帝”《观念》，VIII 28）。《论永久和平》强调从“能够”变为“应当”：人类有责任去从事永久和平的达成（见《论永久和平》，VIII 368）。  在《学科之争》的第二部分，即“哲学学科与法学学科的争执”，康德辨别了作为代表历史的三种观点，他拒绝所有这三种观点：人类是道德的（a）人类是恶的（b）相反，人类在不断地改善，或者（c）“人类不会永恒变坏”（《争论》，VII 81）。他对经验的种类的探究很重视，一个人能够对决定这件事很感兴趣，但是他不能回答非社会的社会性，这在《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》被发现，而且在《论永久和平》中被强调。  在这里，他强烈要求的是早已提到的那种在共和主义革命中的利他的但同时也是无害的“参与”。这个“巨大的兴趣”证明人性的“道德特征”，因为个人冒着成为一个革命者被控告的危险，VII 85）。然后，康德举了个例子，即与爱好战斗的责任感，这使我们想起理性的事实（《纯粹理性批判》，§6,评论）。正如在这种条件下（在那儿，道德意识被一个人的判断所欺骗，甚至当对待死亡的时候，人们应该拒绝给“假的证据反对诚实的人” (V 30)），因此在这里，尽管有个人风险，人们却说出一个共和国的法规。 |

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| *5.3 Against “Cycloptic Erudition”*  Although Kant frequently engaged history and historical experience, he nowhere undertakes a systematic critique comparable to that of the critique of the experience of nature in the first and the critique of moral experience in the second *Critique*. However, the fact that Kant’s engagement of the philosophy of history does not produce a critique of historical reason is no indication of Kant’s disparagement of the discipline. On the contrary, the leading theme of his *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship*, the account of the emergence of free will, already demonstrates how important history is for Kant. Furthermore, in this text Kant sketches what are for him two central ideas that he later takes up in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (§§ 83 ff.): the “progression” of civil society to “a status of global citizenry” and the notion of humanity as the final goal of creation.  Not least, he bundles in his texts devoted to the philosophy of history a colorful bouquet of themes that are important to him. Among them belongs the fundamental notion of Kant’s teleology found in the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* that all natural capacities of a creature are determined for a complete and purposeful development (*Idea*, Theorem 1); further, the specific “application” of this theorem to humanity (Theorems 2 and 3); also the fundamental notions of Kant’s anthropology like un-social sociality, the tendency to laziness and its opposing forces, the fervidness of ambition, bossiness, and greed (Theorem 4); in the colorful plethora of events, this task addition, the necessities that accompany leadership (Theorem 6); the significance of a legal state, called civil society, and a law-conforming coexistence of nations (Theorem 7); and not least, the project of conceiving history according to an idea (i.e., according to an [*a priori*] concept of reason) (Theorem 9).  It is not because of a lack of recognition of the significance of historical elements that Kant didn’t write a critique of historical reason. Rather, according to him humanity possesses only three fundamental powers: understanding, the appetitive faculty, and their “connecting link,” the power of (reflecting) judgment (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 176 ff.), which is why there can be only three critiques. As a consequence, one cannot expect a critique of historical reason any more than one can expect a critique of religion. At best, one can expect a quasi-critique that implements under Kant’s guidance, a practical philosophy of freedom.  Nonetheless, Neo-Kantianism with its fascination with the philosophy of science sought in Kant’s philosophy of history the outline of a methodology for historical scholarship or, more broadly, the human- and cultural sciences. However, one cannot claim that this was the goal of Kant’s philosophy of history. The latter does not ground historical “understanding” (a grasp of meaning) from particularities in contrast to the explanation from universals by the natural sciences. It develops even less a hermeneutic as the method uniting the human sciences. Less interested in the usual concern of the historian, history in is left entirely to an “actually, merely empirically conceived history” (*Idea*, VIII 30). Kant himself is concerned with history exclusively from the standpoint of a philosophy. In this respect, it remains presumptuous in a provocative sense for the professional historian:  First of all, in agreement with Voltaire, Iselin and Herder, the provocation is not satisfied with more or less small snippets of history. It wants nothing less than comprehension of the historical world of the entire human race. Such ambition would overtax every researcher, even a network of researchers. However, Kant is clever and philosophical enough that he doesn’t seek a world- or universal history in the usual, practical sense as in the cases of Voltaire, Iselin, and Wegelin. He is not concerned with the historical development of peoples, empires, and cultures with respect to their empirically determinable commonalities, differences, and reciprocal relationships.  Far more, Kant asks (which is the second provocation) to what extent world history is of interest for humankind as a practical, rational being without needing to know the empirical details just mentioned. He is entirely concerned with an understanding of meaning; however, not of particularities but of a universal: the totality of human history. He contemplates, namely, what are the conditions independent of experience by which the course of history appears to be rational in two respects: first, as a structured and, second, as a purposeful, insofar, meaningful totality.  Because Kant is not seeking a “haphazard aggregation” but a structured totality, a system (VIII 29), the idea of the *Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship* is a regulative principle in the sense of the first *Critique*. Kant features reason but not a theoretical, rather, a practical reason in his investigation. Historians who renounce practical reason and disseminate a historical knowledge without concern for purposiveness possess, according to an expressive image from Kant’s *Logic*, only a “cycloptic erudition;” because one eye is missing, “the eye of philosophy” (*Logic*, IX 45). As if he wished to allude to Voltaire’s intention to be “en philosophe,” Kant writes explicitly as a “philosophical head” that, to be sure, also “must be very historically knowledgeable” (*Idea*, VIII 30). However, otherwise than Voltaire, he develops a truly, philosophical theory that is, above all, practically relevant. The unifying element for the plethora of events lies for Kant in the development of the rational capacity in the service of freedom by which this development enhances legal progress and the potential for the moral improvement of humanity. Kant arrives at a perspective for which neither the empirical historical sciences nor scientific theory is interested. However, he does so not by means of a critique of the empirical historical sciences but in sharp contrast to them. Kant is concerned, first, with a true history of a species that, second, is examined under rational and, above all, moral aspects.  5.4 The Motor: Antagonisms  According to Kant’s teleological presupposition, all of the natural capacities of creatures are designed for eventual complete and purposeful development (Idea, Theorem 1). In spite of the moral imperative to develop his talents and capacities (Groundwork, IV 401), the particular natural capacities of a person that require the application of reason are attained not in the individual but only in the course of generations (hence, are completely developed only in the species) (Idea, Theorem 2). This natural goal of the complete development of capacities is taken to include even human nature itself. The meaning of history, then, occurs, as it were, behind our backs by our cooperation but without our planning. This corresponds approximately to what pre-Kantian philosophy called providence but Hegel called the Weltgeist.  Simply put, according to philosophers like Hobbes, the basic instinct that drives action consists in the “egotistical” desire for personal survival in contrast to Aristotle (later Cumberland, Pufendorf, and Locke) who places the drive in the political or social nature of humanity. Kant views both as correct but their absolutization as false. He speaks of an antagonism (conflict) whereby the “conflict between two parties with respect to a common goal unites them (concordia discors, discordia concors)” (Conflict of the Faculties, VII 35). Yet, because this conflict occurs internally, a person is not conflict-laden only with it comes to his social perspective but already in himself. By means of this thesis with respect to the anthropological motor driving the development of all human capacities, Kant improves upon the alternative between Aristotle’s predominantly cooperative nature and Hobbes’ conflict-laden nature.  More precisely, Kant takes antagonism to be the “un-social sociality of humanity (i.e., the inclination to enter a social situation that involves a pervasive resistance that permanently threatens to shatter the society)” (Idea, VIII 20). A person is sociable to the extent that he tends toward a comfortable-easygoing life; unsocial to the extent that he distinguishes himself, stands out, and, thereby, seeks his own advantage – even, when necessary, against the resistance of others. Precisely because of this inclination (i.e., to ambition, bossiness, and greed [Idea, VIII 21; see Anthropology, VII 271, earlier Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. 13]), all of a person’s powers that otherwise would atrophy are awakened for the development of culture and the arts. The driving force of un-social sociality, according to Kant, consists of two fundamental, driving forces: negatively, in the hardship that comes from incessant warfare (Idea, Theorem 7) and, positively, in “commercialism” that “is incompatible with war” (Conflict of the Faculties, VIII 368).  When it came to the formation of the League of Nations following WWI and the United Nations following WWII, it might be that the aversion to war was a strong, motivating force. However, the very necessity for a second attempt to establish a world-wide community devoted to peace demonstrates that humanity’s memory is very short, that the experience of hardship is quickly forgotten, and, apparently (almost) every generation must make its own mistakes. Furthermore of course, wars (especially the wars of others) are profitable for those who provide the weapons (i.e., to the extent that they serve commercialism). Kant, of course, is correct that, in order to foster the will for a world-wide community devoted to peace, one must humanize war, then reduce its occurrence, and, finally, to completely eliminate wars of aggression. Given humanity’s “unsociality,” it is questionable whether there will ever be a complete elimination of wars of aggression.  However, Kant doesn’t appeal solely to humanity’s un-social sociality. In order to accomplish the goal of a world community devoted to peace, he views humanity as possessing a shared responsibility that, in his Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship, nevertheless, he restricts to an acceleration (“to bring about more quickly:” (VIII, 27). Even so, one is only so inclined when the goal is no mere utopia but, on the contrary, is to be expected “with certainty” (ibid.), which is in fact the case. Nations who neglect “their internal culture” (i.e., with respect to civic freedom) suffer the loss of “power and influence” (ibid.) in comparison to other nations so that already self-interest (namely, commercialism that encourages individual and collective prosperity) speaks for a meaningful assumption of shared responsibility.  At the base of this shared responsibility is an enlightened self-interest. However, Kant, as we have seen, goes further in the second Conflict of the Faculties. With his (by no means harmless) enthusiasm for the French Revolution comes a genuine moral motivation. Nothing contradicts viewing enthusiasm only as an example of a moral motivation that broadens beyond self-interest humanity’s shared responsibility for the establishment of a world community devoted to peace.  5.5 Progressive Thinking: Unassuming - Presumptuous  Whether we talking about the development of human capacities, the formation of a cosmopolitan condition and perpetual peace, or the surpassing of culture and civilization with morality, the motif of Kant’s historical philosophizing has the assumption of progress at its core.  Normally, what one means by progress is no accidental but an ordered or purposeful development from a lower to a higher condition. When one examines the notion carefully, however, it contains clear differences. According to one view, humanity is proceeding from ignorance and superstition to enlightenment and science; according to a second, from poverty or subjugation to prosperity or freedom; from yet a third perspective, from unschooled animality to educated humanity. The ideal goal, finally, is taken to be a comprehensive liberation of humanity from all restraints: not only from natural constraints but also from economic, legal-political, and religious constraints to arrive at a state of affairs where humanity shapes its history by itself.  Initially, Kant, who even coined the expression “progress” (see Koselleck/Meier 1975, 381) with expressions like perfection and perfectibility having been employed earlier, employed the term in a historically natural, more precisely, geo-historical sense. In one of his earliest writings, The Question as to Whether the Earth is Growing Old (1754), he speaks in reference to “our terrestrial globe” in terms of “advancement in age” (I 200). He speaks in another sense in Dreams of a Spiritseer (1766) of the “progress of investigation” (II 324).  Because Kant views human development in terms of freedom and morality, history appears meaningful when humanity rises out of its rough natural condition to the status of freedom and freedom’s perfection. This is precisely the theme of Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship. It was not first Hegel’s philosophy of history but already Kant’s philosophy of history is a progressive history of freedom that is concerned, above all, with an external communal life, not internal freedom. It aims toward a rule of law that, initially, governs nations domestically but also, then, internationally. When achieved, two conditions will prevail: politically, one will have overcome despotism; and, culturally, one will have overcome barbarism. To be sure, when it comes to moral development and the disposition to moral goodness (Idea, VIII 26) as well as to “heartfelt desire for the good” (VIII 28), inner freedom also plays a role.  The expectation of a development from better, superior, to more perfect belongs so essentially to the fundamental notion of European Enlightenment that one can find in the idea of progress the civil religion of the Enlightenment. One counts on scientific-technological innovations and seeks the elimination of superstition; one expects a growth in prosperity and political development; and, not least, one anticipates moral improvement. In other words, one aims for a general improvement, a universal perfectibility.  Doubtlessly, the Age of Enlightenment can point to brilliant successes in the natural sciences and technology. The European Siècle des lumières is the epoch of the mathematical sciences but also of geographical discovery as well as the invention of new observational- and measurement instruments, of technical processes and equipment. Additionally, it is an epoch of self- conscious intellectuals who took upon themselves to critically examine pedagogy, even the state and church. However, given its unquestionable success, the epoch was in danger of encouraging the extrapolation of an un- restricted, rational capacity as well as the belief in a constant improvement of all living conditions including the moral development of humanity and society. Kant maintained that such confidence in progress was exaggerated, and he concentrated, above all, on legal progress.  5.6 On the Epistemic Status  According to Kant, neither experience nor theoretical reason is capable of answering the question which of the three development-“theories” is correct – constant progress, persistent decline, or stagnation. As a consequence, he liberated the notion of progress from the world of objective knowledge and applied it to (moral-) practical reason. “The tendency of continuous progress of humanity for the better,” he says in his Nachlaß, is “a moral-practical idea of reason” according to which practical reason rules action (XIX 611). More precisely, the corresponding development is a hypothetical motif according to which the reflecting power of judgment interprets in moral-practical deliberation the course of history teleologically as a process of increasing cultivation, discipline, and, finally, moral improvement.  Philosophical, a priori “knowledge” of history is, in any event, of a moral, practical nature; the assumption of a legal development is no theoretical necessity but a regulative idea of legal, practical reason. This accomplishes no less than the warding off of the fear that human history is meaningless. Kant writes his philosophy of history in opposition to an, otherwise, threatening despair. He combats the danger of hopelessness with a “comforting outlook on history” (Idea, VIII 30), with a belief in reason according to which the task of corporate existence according to rational principles is by no means absolutely unachievable.  In order to gain a further clarification of the epistemic status of Kant’s philosophy of history, one can turn to the three famous questions that unify the interests of human reason, according to Kant: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What can I hope for? (Critique of Pure Reason, B 833). The three questions are not formulated in the impersonal, third person but in the first person singular by which they unequivocally articulate that they are the concern of the enquirers. Also characteristic for all three questions is something that one would not expect from a highly speculative work like the Critique of Pure Reason: They have an existential significance.  All three questions are addressed by the philosophy of history. Because here a natural mechanism is in play, the idea of the Idea for a General History based on the Principle of World Citizenship as a regulative research idea applies along with the ideas of antagonism and un-social sociality to the first question. Applicable to the second question is that, despite its natural condition, humanity bears a personal responsibility that it recognizes because, according to Theorem 8 of the Idea, humanity has a “heartfelt interest ... in the good,” that in turn “ascends bit by bit to the throne and itself has influence on the principles by which it [should] reign” (Idea, VIII 28). In this fashion, humanity can and should accelerate progress. | 5.3针对“一叶障目的博学”  虽然康德经常使用历史和历史的经验，但是他没有进行系统的批判比得上第一批判中对自然经验的批判和第二批判中对道德经验的批判。然而，事实是康德对历史哲学的研究不会产生一个批判的历史原因是没有迹象表明康德对规则的轻视。相反，他的关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念和关于自由意志的出现，早已揭示了历史对于康德的重要性。此外，在这个文本中康德草拟出他的两个核心观点，这两个观点他在之后的《判断力批判》中将提出来：公民社会的发展到世界公民的身份和人性的概念作为创造的最终目标。  并非最不重要的是，他在他致力于历史哲学的文本中加入一个像色彩缤纷的花束一样的主题，这对他来说很重要。其中，康德目的论的基本概念可以在“关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念”中“一种造物的所有自然禀赋都注定有朝一日完全地并且合乎目的地展开”（命题一）中找到；进一步说，这个定理的具体“应用”体现在人身上（命题二、三）；另外，康德的人类学的基本概念如非社会的社会性，懒惰的倾向及其对立化的力量，求名誉、统治欲和占有欲的推动（命题四）；此外，当人生活在自己的其他同类中间时，就必须有一个主人（命题六）；法律状态的意义，称为公民社会和一个法律一致的国家共同体（命题七）。尤其是这项构想历史的工作是根据一个观点（例如：根据一个理论的先验的概念）（命题九）  康德没有写对历史原因的批判并不是因为缺乏承认历史元素的重要性意义。相反，根据他的人性只拥有三个基本能力：理性、欲求能力和它们之间的联系，以及判断力（判断力批判V176），这就是为什么只会有三大批判。因此，不能指望任何一个历史理性批判可以超过一个可以期待的宗教批判。最好的情况是，可以期待在康德的指导下会有一个准确的批判，关于自由的实践哲学。  尽管如此，新康德主义的魅力与科学哲学在康德的历史哲学中寻求一个历史研究方法概述，更广泛地说，人类文化科学。然而，人们不能声称这是康德的历史哲学的目标。相比于从自然科学的一般概念来解释，后者不能从特性基础的历史理解（理解意义）。它的发展甚至比解释学作为人文科学方法的统一更慢。不太感兴趣历史学家通常的关注，在丰富多彩的历史事件中，这一任务是完全留给一个“实际上，纯然经验性地撰写的历史”。康德自己只从哲学的立场出发，关注历史。在这方面，他仍然是自不量力的具有挑衅意义的历史学家：  首先，在与伏尔泰、艾斯林、 赫尔德达成的统一中，这种挑衅不满意更多或更少的历史片段。它想要的是对整个人类历史世界的理解。这样的野心会使每一个研究者，甚至是一个网络的研究者负担过重。然而，康德足够聪明和冷静，他没有在通常世界寻求一个世界的或普遍的历史，类似于实际意义上的伏尔泰、艾斯林、韦格林的理论。他不关心公民、帝国和文化的历史发展，尊重他们的经验确定的共性，差异，和相互关系  更多的是，康德问（这是第二次挑衅），世界历史是怎样的程度让人类作为一个有实践性和理性的存在有意义而不需要知道刚才提到的经验细节。他完全关心意义的理解，但是，他关心的不是特殊性，而是一个普遍性：人类历史的总体性。他深思熟虑，也就是说，是什么使条件独立于经验的，其中历史的进程似乎在两方面是理性：首先，作为一个结构，其次，作为一个有意义的整体性而言。  因为康德不寻求一个“没有计划的集合”而是一个结构化的整体，一个系统（VII29），在“关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念”中的观点是在第一批判的意义上是规范原则。康德的特征理性不是一个理论，而在他的学术研究中是实践理性。历史学家们否认实践理性并且不关注目的性的拥有从而传播历史知识，根据康德逻辑中表现力的形象，仅仅是“一叶障目的博学”；因为缺少一只眼睛，即“哲学的眼睛”（逻辑、IX 45）。如果他想暗示伏尔泰的目的是成为“哲学家”，康德明确的写到“哲学头脑”，此外，还“必须很精通历史”（VIII30）。然而，除伏尔泰以外，他发展了一个真正的哲学理论，最重要的是，与实践相关的。大量的事件的统一的元素在于康德在发展理性能力造福于自由，这一发展提高了了法律的进步和人类道德改善的潜力。康德达到一个程度，无论是对经验的历史科学和科学理论都是有兴趣的。然而，他这样做不是依靠对经验的历史科学的批判，而是在与它们进行鲜明的对比。康德关心的是，第一，有物种的一个真正的历史，第二，是在理性审视，高于一切，道德方面。  5.4 原动力：对立  根据康德目的论的预设，一种造物的所有自然禀赋都注定有朝一日完全地并且合乎目的的展开（命题一）。尽管道德律令提升他自己的才华和能力（IV401），一个人独特的自然能力是把运用自己所有力量的规则和意图扩展到远远超出自然本能之外的一种能力（因此，只有在物种中完全展开）（命题二）。能力全面发展的自然目标包括甚至是人性本身。历史的意义，某种程度上它是在我们的背后通过我们的合作而没有我们的规划。这大约相当于之所以前康德哲学称为先验的但黑格尔哲学称世界精神。  简单地说，根据哲学家霍布斯，基本的本能驱使动机包括在“自我本位”的自我生存的欲望，相比之下，亚里士多德（之后的坎伯兰、普芬多夫和洛克）将这种驱使放在政治的或社会的人性本质之下。康德的观点看似都是正确的但他绝对化的观点是错误的。他所说的对立（冲突）是通过“就一个共同目标，双方之间的冲突将它们联系在一起”（VII35）.然而，因为这种冲突发生在内部，一个人不是满载冲突的，仅仅是涉及到他的社会观点才会满载冲突，但是这种冲突已经存在于他自身了。通过这篇关于尊重人类对立的原动力驱动所有人类能力的发展的文章，康德提高了亚里士多德占主导地位的共同的自然和霍布斯充满冲突的自然中的一个。  更确切的说，康德采取对立的意思是“非社会的社会性，也就是说，人们进入社会的倾向，但这种倾向却不断威胁要分裂这个社会的一种普遍对抗结合在一起”（VIII20）。一个人善于交际则他倾向于舒适悠闲的生活；一个人不合群，则他使崭露头角，脱颖而出，并且从此寻求自己的优势–甚至，必要时，对抗来自他人的阻力。正是因为这种倾向（即求名欲、统治欲和占有欲<VIII21,见人类学VII21，早期霍布斯的利维坦12章>）,所有人类的力量随着文化和艺术的发展而觉醒，否则就将衰退。根据康德的理论，非社会的社会性的驱动力包含两个基本的驱动力：消极的一面是苦难来自不断地战争（命题七）；积极的一面是“商业化”与“战争的不相容”。（VIII368）  可能是由于对战争的厌恶成为一个强大的驱动力，促使第一次世界大战后国际联盟的形成和第二次世界大战后联合国的形成。  然而，非常有必要第二次尝试去建立世界范围内致力于和平的示范，而人类的记忆非常短暂，关于苦难的经历很快就被遗忘，而且显然的，每一代人都必须自己犯错误。此外，当然，战争（尤其是别人的战争）对于那些提供武器的人来说是盈利的（即，在某种程度上，他们服务于商业主义）。康德当然是正确的，他为了促进全球共同体致力于和平的意愿，必须使战争变得人性化，然后减少其发生，最后，彻底消除侵略战争。给予人类的“非社会性”，它是否能够永远完全的消除侵略战争这是值得怀疑的。然而，康德并没有完全的呼吁人类的非社会的社会性。为了实现国际社会致力于和平的目标，他认为人类具有一个共同的责任，在他的“关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念”一文中，不过，他制约着加速（“带来更迅速”（VIII，27）。即便如此，当人类的目标是纯粹的乌托邦时就仅具有这样的倾向，但是相反是可以预见的“确定性”（同上），而这是实际的情况。一个忽视了它“内部文化”的国家（即尊重公民的自由）在与其他国家相比时将失去“权势”（同上），而早已变成利己主义的（即鼓励个人和集体繁荣的商业化）寻求一个关于共同责任的有意义的假设。  在这一共同责任的基础上，是一个进步的利己主义。然而，正如我们所看到的，康德在关于能力的第二次冲突中走的更远。他对法国大革命的热情来自于纯粹的道德动机（并非是无害的）。没有什么否认审视的热情，它只作为道德动机的例子去扩大超越利己主义人类的共同责任，建立一个致力于和平的世界共同体。  5.5进步思想：谦逊-骄傲  无论我们谈论的人类能力的发展，世界共同体和永久和平的建立，或者卓越的文化和道德文明，康德历史哲学的主题有关于这些方面进步的假设。  通常情况下，一个人的进步不意味着偶然，而是从一个较低的到较高程度的有序的或者有目的的发展。然而当一个人仔细审查了这个概念会发现它包含了明显的差异。根据一种观点，人类正在从无知和迷信到启蒙和科学；根据第二种观点，人们正从贫困或征服到繁荣或自由；根据第三种观点，人们正从未受教育的动物性的到受教育的人类。最后，理想的目标从所有的限制中是全面解放人性：不仅从自然的限制中，而且从经济、法律、政治和宗教的限制中解放人性，从而达到一个国家的公共事务由人类通过它自己塑造它自己的历史。  最初康德甚至创造“进步”这一措辞（see Koselleck/Meier 1975, 381）和早期已经被使用的类似于完美和完全的措辞，在历史上的自然中去使用这些术语，更准确的说，在地理历史意义上使用。在他最早的一个作品“关于从物理学观点考察地球是否已经衰老的问题”（1754）中，他根据“年龄的变大”提到关于“我们的地球”（I 200）。他在另一篇文章“视灵者的幻想”（1766）中提到“调查的进展”。(II 324)  因为康德从自由和道德的角度来看待人类的发展，当人类从它野蛮的自然状态上升到自由和自由的完满状态时，历史似乎是有意义的。这正是“关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念”的主题。这不是最开始的黑格尔的历史哲学，而康德的历史哲学已经是被关注的关于自由的进步的历史，是关于外部的公共生活，而不是内部的自由。它的目标是一个法律规范，在最初管理国家内部事务，然后成为国际上的规范。当满足两个条件的时候才是实现这一目标：在政治上，必须克服专制；在文化上，一定要克服野蛮。可以肯定的是，当涉及到道德发展和性格的道德善良（idea，VIII26）以及“对好衷心的渴望”（VIII28），内在自由也起着作用。  期望从一个更好、更优越的方面到本质上属于欧洲启蒙思想的基本概念的更完美的发展，在那里人们可以在进步的思想中找到的公民宗教的启示。一个依靠科学技术创新，并寻求消除迷信，一个是期望繁荣和政治的发展；并且，最后但是最重要的是，预期道德的改善。换句话说，是追求一个整体上的提高，和通用性。  毫无疑问，启蒙时代在自然科学和技术方面有着辉煌的成就。欧洲启蒙时代是数学科学、地理大发现还有新的技术工艺和设备的观察—测量仪器的发明的时代。此外，它是一个具有自我意识的知识分子的时代，他们自己批判地审视教育学，甚至是国家和教会。然而，鉴于其无可置疑的成功，时代这种不受限制的推断，理性的能力以及在所有的包括人类和社会的道德发展的生存条件都在不断地发展的状态中的信念，是处于危险当中的，康德认为，这种进步的信心被夸大了，他首先关注的也是最主要的是法律上的进步。  5.6论认识论的地位  康德认为，无论是经验还是理论理性都不能回答这个问题，即不断进步、持续下降和停滞不前这三个发展“理论”究竟是否正确。因此，他解放了从客观知识世界的进步的概念，并把它应用到（道德）实践的原因。“为了更好的人类不断进步的趋势，”他在遗书中说，是“道德的实践理性观念”根据实践理性的规则行动（XIX 611）。更确切的说，相对应的发展是一个假定的主题，根据判断的反应能力，它把在道德实践中思考历史的目的论当做一个文明不断增加，到最后成为道德提高的过程。  在任何一个事件中，哲学、关于历史的先验的“知识”具有道德的、实践的性质；关于法律发展的假设没有理论的必要性，但法律、实践理性却作为一个调节的理念。这种完成不低于击退恐惧而人类历史是没有意义的。否则，康德把他的历史哲学思想写成反对绝望的威胁。他与“历史欣慰的前景”当中绝望的威胁作斗争，用理性的信念，根据理性原则共同存在的任务是绝对无法实现的  为了进一步阐明康德的历史哲学的认识论地位，可以转向统一人类理性利益的三大问题，根据康德的说法：“1、我能知道什么？2、我该做什么？3、我能希望什么？（纯粹理性批判，B 833）。三个问题是不客观的制定，第三人却在第一人称单数，他们明确地表达他们的查询问题。所有这三个问题的特点是，人们不会期望从事一个深度推理的工作，如纯粹理性批判：他们有一个存在的意义。  这三个问题都是由历史哲学解决的。因为这里的自然机制在运行，关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念作为一种规范性的研究理念，在第一个问题上也适用于对抗性和非社会的社会性思想。适用于第二个问题是，不管它的自然条件，人类承担了一个个人的责任，因为它承认，根据命题八的想法，人类有一个“根本的利益…”，“这反过来又一点一点地提升到更高程度，它本身就影响了它[应该]统治的原则”（VIII28）。在这种情况下，人类可以而且应该加快进步。 |

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| Primarily, Kant’s philosophy of history is concerned with the third question. The term “hope,” admittedly, only occurs more in passing. In the Idea, for example, it appears only in the introduction, the footnote of proposition six and twice in proposition nine (VIII 30) although its first use here is clear enough in the sense of “with reason to hope.” In any event, Kant employs the term, but he doesn’t explain it –much less does he address its systematic meaning.  Among the three questions, the third question assumes a special- as well as central-position in Kant’s philosophy of history in that history is “simultaneously practical and theoretical” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 833). It is practical because it is governed, as we’ve seen, by goals: not only the development of the capacity of reason but also legal progress and the potential for moral improvement. It is theoretical because it adheres to antagonisms of a natural mechanism (i.e., causal principle).  In order to establish further the epistemic character of hope and, along with it, the cognitive status of the philosophy of history, it is advisable to look at the section in the first Critique that immediately follows the discussion of hope. With a brilliant masterstroke, “On Meaning, Knowing, and Believing” (B 848 ff.), Kant situates his “epistemology” of hope in a systematic epistemology that, by means of the introduction of a new, central epistemic tier, abrogates the dualism of meaning (doxa) and knowing or science (episteme) that has reigned from antiquity down to today. (On the three epistemic tiers, see as well, Logic, Introduction, IX.)  Introduction of the new, third step of “belief” protects items from the status of an epistemically, worthless rank that have been banned from the realm of knowledge. In the Critique of Pure Reason, these objects include God and the immortal soul. In Idea, however, the notions of the development of rational capacities and the establishment of states governed by law, and, even further, legal coexistence contribute to the moral improvement of humanity.  It is self-evident, that Kant clearly does not dismiss history. He concedes that finding a meaning for it is not easy because initially history offers a comforting aspect that in the end, despite occasional “wisdom with respect to particulars, finds everything from a distance to be foolishness, childish vanity, frequently woven together with childish maliciousness and destructiveness” (Idea, VIII 18). According to Kant, one can take history to be the consequence of wars that destroy all goodness and, for that reason, trades in “evil and the corruption of morals” (Conflict of the Faculties, VII 86).  Although for this reason pessimism, even despair that takes history with all of its misery to be meaningless perhaps even senseless threatens optimism, Kant believes he is able to discover meaning, but only under three conditions: first, one must consider world-history, second, one must consider worldhistory in terms of the question of meaning; and, third, one must not locate the meaning question just anywhere but limit it to world-history.  As a component of the faith of reason, the notion of progress defended by Kant’s philosophy of history belongs neither to fact nor fiction. The goal of human history can be sketched entirely as a practical idea. Its origin, however, is concerned with another, cognitive form: conjecture. In this respect, two epistemically and fundamentally different forms of knowledge come together in Kant’s earlier philosophy of history. When it comes to the meaning and goal of world-history, a rational faith in hope is in charge; however, when it comes to questions of origin, a rational conjecture.  The later Conflict of the Faculties introduces a further epistemic form: the escalation of hope to expectation: Although one is not able to predict theoretically the political, final goal of history of perpetual peace (see Perpetual Peace, VIII 368) – because factual history speaks from experience too powerfully in opposition to all certainty of progress (Religion within the Limits of mere Reason, VI 19 f.) –, Kant remains optimistic. He sees confirmed in the, already discussed, not risk-free enthusiasm for the French Revolution, the readiness on the part of humanity to fulfill its legal-moral task and to vocalize its desire for a rational, lawful, social order (Conflict of the Faculties, VII 85 ff.).  In this respect, Kant proposed even before the French historian and sociologist, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) that, at the latest since the French Revolution, humanity lives in an epoch in which peoples, despite manifold resistance, strive for just, national governments and give history a meaning by means of this striving. To be sure, it is no longer merely the antagonisms within human nature that are responsible for legal progress but also the very aspiration of history (that includes morality and freedom).  All three epistemic forms [meaning, knowing, and believing] characterize a genuine philosophy of history in contrast to that of the empirical sciences. As a consequence, there are four epistemic or cognitive elements to history: rational faith, philosophical conjecture, a legitimate hope/expectation, and, finally, what Kant surely does not want to suppress (Idea, VIII 30), the empirical sciences.  Having reached the pinnacle of his philosophical influence, Hegel published Elements of the Philosophy of Right: For Use in His Lectures, a philosophy of law, morality, and politics (October 1820, with the publication year of 1821). The last sub-section of this text has the title “World History,” which for Hegel can be called “philosophy of history” because, according to his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, “philosophy of history is of nothing other than the reflective observation of history.”    In his “Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Law Faculty” (Conflict of the Faculties, VII 79 ff.), Kant distinguished among three “kinds of representation” for human history – all of which are to be rejected: a continuous decline into perdition; an open-ended process of improvement; and a ceaseless alternation between improvement and decline. His own convincing alternative was the outline of a “prophesying history of the human species” that allows the expectation of the growth of republics in the world’s nations as a consequence of selfishless (but equally dangerous) participation of observers in the republican revolution in France. For his part, in the introduction to his philosophy of history lectures, Hegel addresses three ways of approaching history (a theme that is absent actually in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right). However, Hegel’s three approaches to history have little to do with Kant’s. Hegel’s first two approaches are concerned with forms of empirical, historical description (something that Kant also thoroughly acknowledges but not the way that Hegel does) and, as a consequence, Hegel gives them more weight. Most notably though, Hegel’s three approaches are taken to be legitimate unlike Kant’s three illegitimate approaches to history. Furthermore, for Hegel, above these three levels one is presented with a growing presence of spirit. Kant’s sharp distinction between the empirical and the philosophical gives way to an internal dynamic that reminds one of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes) so that one here is permitted to speak of a phenomenology of historical spirit.  Hegel’s first way of engaging history, the “original history” of a Herodotus or a Thucydides, transfers “what externally transpired into the realm of mental (geistige) representation” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 11). Its authors “bind together that which fleetingly transpires and lay it in the Temple of Mnemosyne [memory] for immortality” (12). The second way, that of “reflective history,” extends beyond “the present with respect to spirit” (Geist) (14) – as a kind of compendium that undertakes an “evaluation of historical accounts” with respect to their truth and believability or, as well, in terms of the history of general aspects like art, law, and religion. Finally, the third genre, that of “philosophical history” or “philosophy of history,” is “nothing other than the reflective observation of history.” However, it is concerned with a single, a priori thought, namely, “because reason governs the world, world history also has transpired rationally” (20). According to Hegel, “reason is not so impotent that it can only bring about the ideal expressed solely as an ought” (21).  Because the argument with respect to mere ought belongs to the repertoire of Hegel’s critique of Kant, one could suspect that there is a silent critique of Kant here. However, if that is what Hegel intended, his critique is even less appropriate. That world history is increasingly rational, that there occurs in the history of the human species a development of all rational capacities (and, to this end, that there is progress toward legally-moral, lawful relationships and, finally, to cosmopolitan world-citizenship), this is precisely the central claim of Kant’s philosophy of history as formulated in Kant’s primary text devoted to the philosophy of history, Idea.  In addition to sharing with Kant the role of reason in world history, there is a second commonality: Hegel’s philosophy of history belongs just as does Kant’s to professional philosophy. A third commonality between Hegel and Kant is systematic. Even though Kant does not situate the philosophy of history (as does Hegel) directly in his philosophy of law, his Idea is concerned with the characteristic, external freedom of his philosophy of law. Additionally, Kant extends his philosophy of history in the third section devoted to international law of his On the Proverbial Saying: "All is Very Well in Theory, but Not Good in Practice" and, further in Perpetual Peace and, not least, in his Conflict of the Faculties (i.e., in three texts directly concerned with the philosophy of law).  Hegel places the philosophy of history in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right in a preeminent position, the conclusion. By placing it here, Hegel constructs the pinnacle of a continuous intensification in accordance with his dialectical method. Upon closer examination, though, this conclusion is a curious pinnacle: In the course of the Elements, the sections present a building climax that step by step develops the “idea of the free will in and for itself” that commences with abstract volition in “abstract right,” to then address reflective volition itself (“morality”), to arrive at the unity and truth of both moments in “ethics.” Along the way, the argument advances from the natural spirit (Geist) of the “family,” over the stage of divisiveness (“civil society”), to objective freedom of the state. However, within the section devoted to the state, one encounters an anti-climax rather than a climax. This is because the alternative to the free will (i.e., a context of complete legal relationships and ethics) is already achieved at the very first stage (that of “national right”). With the second stage (that of “international right”), in contrast, the ethical totality is left to chance. Whereas the final section –in contrast to Kant, here devoted to world history not cosmopolitan worldcitizenry – is determined ambivalently with respect to free volition.  Our philosopher remains true to his dialectical method. World history is thoroughly a synthesis of national and international law. This is because “in world history, spiritual [geistige] reality occurs in its comprehensive totality as internal and external” (Elements, §341), which unquestionably amounts to a further intensification, even a perfection – nevertheless, so that, with the negative, the anti-climactic moment, the escalation consists in a subjective,not an explicitly rational “tribunal” (ibid.). In contrast, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (35), world history is a “slaughterhouse … to which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals are brought to carnage.” Nonetheless, Hegel maintains that universal reason stands up to particular capriciousness (on the part of peoples, states, and individuals). As a consequence, history can be determined according to its inner rational laws and its immanent necessity can be recognized by philosophy – however, it cannot be accelerated by the subject as in the case of Kant (see Idea, VIII 27).  That the philosophy of law leads one to view world history as a “slaughterhouse” and not (as in the case with Kant) to the highest political good (perpetual peace) hardly brings Hegel sympathy. From our perspective today, from the dominance of a universalistic legal ethic with its reflections on human rights, and from an increasing legalization of international relations, Kant appears to be clearly superior. Hegel rejects the notion of a perpetual peace (Elements, § 333 A). He declares war to be indispensable for the “ethical health” of peoples (Elements, § 324 A). When it comes to international relations, he is satisfied with an international law that not only (as is the case in Kant [so Perpetual Peace, VIII 354 ff., however, not in Theorem 7 of Idea]) renounces a legal, world order but also itself renounces its modest preliminary state of a league of nations.  Nevertheless, when it comes to the philosophy of history, Hegel shares ideas of the Enlightenment with Kant basic. First, he also conceives history as universal history and this as a history of progress. In this respect, though, he as well as Kant (in contrast to the exuberant proponents of the Enlightenment) does not assume a general progress but concentrates on the advancement of freedom and reason – above all with respect to legal reason. Further, for Hegel no differently than for Kant, decisive progress comes about for the most part behind the backs of its beneficiaries.  What with Adam Smith is the hidden hand in economic life becomes with Kant “intentional nature” (Idea, VIII 17). One can take this to be the cunning of human nature because this nature (of the antagonism of un-social sociality) brings about legal advancement. What is with Kant only described, Hegel labels directly; he speaks explicitly of the “cunning of reason” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Introduction); additionally (again, in consensus with Kant), he speaks of “providence and the plan of providence,” which, however, are something “unknowable and incomprehensible (Elements, § 343 A).  In order for progress to be achieved, according to Hegel, reason or providence employs two subjects. Both “world-historical individuals” and “national geniuses” (what is meant is the way peoples organize their law and constitution) aid the success of reason as free will not in spite of but because of their particular interests (one is reminded of Kant’s enlightened selfinterest). When Hegel, thereby, speaks of a Weltgeist (world spirit), he is not talking of some abstruse power but the entire ethical world of humanity. However, with Kant (clearest in Conflict of the Faculties) the individual’s personal responsibility is added: The creature endowed with freedom can and ought to be the originator of advancement toward the better (see Conflict of the Faculties, VIII 84).  Hegel ends his philosophy of world history with a dialectically interpreted sequence of four “world-historical empires:” the Oriental, Greek, Roman, and Germanic empires. In light of his idea of history as a “slaughterhouse,”, it is useful not to think within the time frame of generations and (of course unknown to Hegel) of the two World Wars, the deployment of atomic bombs, the Holocaust, and the brutal illegal regimes of the 20th and 21st centuries. Hegel thinks of world-historical empires in terms of centuries, even millennia.  This, too, belongs in the appraisal of Hegel’s sub-section “World History” that begins again in a certain respect from below. The Oriental empire does not satisfy the criteria that Hegel develops as a preliminary moment, “national law.” Because of the fusion of the national constitution and legislation with religion and because the “individual personality is without rights,” even the conditions of the systematically, first part of Hegel’s Elements (i.e., “abstract law”) are completely inadequately fulfilled. At all events, when it comes to Hegel’s fourth level (the nation state), spirit (Geist) receives “in its subjectivity, its truth and concrete essence” and becomes “home-grown and reconciled with objectivity” (Elements, § 353). This is because the state develops itself “to the image and reality of reason” (Elements § 360).  A further element shared by Kant and Hegel: In both, mere particularity is relativized by means of the common idea of “education of the human race” (Hegel: Elements, §343 A). Where, then, is the specific difference? Hegel remains the defender of universalism. However, his locating of universalism in bourgeois society stunts the potential of universalism as well as the responsibility of human beings. Hegel acknowledges, to be sure, the achievement of the French Revolution (i.e., in terms of human and civic rights) (see Elements, § 209). He locates them, however, in an economic and not a political world order. Neither in international states’ rights nor in world history do they find a legal-philosophical place. One of the reasons for this lies in Hegel’s narrow concept of cosmopolitism of which he says in the same paragraphs devoted to human rights that he locates it “over against any concrete national life” (ibid.).  To be sure, Hegelians will speak not of a narrowed cosmopolitanism but preferably of a greater realistic sense because Hegel recognizes reality as it is and, presumably, the way it will remain: that states, who jealously guard their sovereignty, will never accept the necessary restriction of their national sovereignty required by a legal world-order. The first half of this sense of reality is correct. At the time of Hegel there was no relinquishment of national sovereignty, and no one could have predicted it. However, already today things are seen differently whether or not it is an expressed or a silent abnegation of national sovereignty – sovereignty-like functions are being assumed by means of domestic and supra-national policies, organizations, and international law, generally. Namely, the latter specify policies by which they assume legislative tasks. One part concerns itself with policy compliance (i.e., it assumes executive authority). In some places, one encounters even arbitrating authority; and already there are world courts. When one takes this all together, there are signs already now of a “soft” form of public power (i.e., in the form of “soft legislation,” “soft executive power,” and “soft juridical power”) whereby a legal world-order is being prepared. Not least, one thinks of the European Union and the United Nations.  In light of these differences between the age of Hegel and today, one can doubt the second half of Hegel’s purported greater realism. The budding readiness to accept smaller restrictions of sovereignty that we experience today make it difficult to absolutely preclude even greater acceptance of restrictions in the future. | 首先，康德的历史哲学关于第三个问题。“希望”这个术语，实事求是地讲，更多的发生在过去。在《理念》里，它仅仅一次出现在介绍、第六个命题以及两次出现在第九个命题，虽然它首要用法就“理性的希望”就足够了。在每一件事里，康德使用这个术语，但是他并没有解释它——他更少强调它的综合意义。    这三个问题里，第三个问题在康德历史哲学中扮演着特别以及核心的地位。这个问题，具体而言，就是认为历史既是实践的，它同时又是理论的。它是实践的，因为它被目的所掌控：这不仅仅是对于理性能力的发展，而且是对于合法的以及可能的道德发展而言的。它是理论的，因为它坚持反对自然的机械化（例如因果关系）。  为了更进一步给认识上的希望以及历史哲学的认识奠定基础，我们去看一下在第一批判里接着希望的讨论，这本身是十分明智的做法。用一个杰出的主题，即“论意见知识和信念”，康德把他关于希望的认识放于他整个认识体系之中，即通过引入新的认识层级，废除意见和知识科学带来的二元论——这样的二元论从古至今统治着我们。  引入第三个环节，即信念的环节，保护了康德认识的主题，并且使得认知之外的领域的价值遭到贬损。在《纯粹理论批判》这里，这些对象包括上帝和不朽的灵魂。在理念这里，理性能力的发展以及由法则管理我们的国家，更进一步，法规促进人类道德的提高，这些都是可能的。  这很明显，康德并不排斥历史。他承认发现历史的意义并不容易。因为历史的开始提供了一个美好的开端，但是在历史的结尾，除了“在个别人身上偶尔闪现出智慧，毕竟最终一切在宏观上都是由愚蠢、幼稚的虚荣交织而成的，常常也是由幼稚的恶意和毁灭欲交织而成的”（8卷中文24）。根据康德所说，一个人可以把历史看作作为毁灭一切神灵的战争，而它是以罪恶和道德的腐败作为交换的。  尽管由于把历史的苦难看作是无意义的甚至是无知，它们所带来的悲观、乃至绝望是对乐观主义的一种威胁，康德相信他仍然可以发现意义的，但是却以如下三点为条件：一是一个人必须考虑世界历史，二是一个人必须就意义的问题而看待世界历史，三一个人不是把意义的问题随意安置，而必须把它限制于世界历史。  作为理性信仰的一部分，康德历史哲学的进步观念既不属于事实，也不属于幻想。人类历史的目标可以被描绘为实践的理想。它源于另外一个认识形式：构造。就这一方面而言，两个与认识有关的、基础性的认识形式出现在康德早期的历史哲学里面。当我们谈到世界历史的意义和目标，一个在希望中的理性信仰出现了，但是，当我们质疑它的源出，它仅仅是出于构造。  后来《学科的冲突》带来更深的认识形式：即扩大了的希望与期望：尽管一个人不可以在理论上预测政治上、最终的世界永恒和平的实现——因为来自经验的真实历史与（我们认为的）确定的历史进程完全相反——康德始终是乐观的。他很确信，就像我们已经讨论过的，并不是对于法国大革命无风险的乐观，他确信愿意去完善作为人性一部分体现的法律-道德，并且为理性的、合法的社会秩序而发声。  在这一方面，康德的提议甚至早于法国历史学家和社会学家，托克维尔，这样的早于具体体现为自从法国大革命以来，人类生活在这样一个纪元，在其中，尽管有各种各样的阻力，人类还是为正义，国家政府，以及给予历史以意义而不断的斗争着。这不再仅仅是为了合法的进步而要由存在于人类本性的对立所应负的责任，而是为了历史的希望（这样的希望包括道德和自由）。    一切认识的形式（意见、知识和意见）塑造了真正的历史哲学，这样的历史哲学是与经验的科学相反的。作为结果，这里对于历史而言，有四种认识或认知原理：理性的信念，哲学的构造，合法的希望或期望已经最后，是看到想要抵制的，经验科学。  作为康德哲学影响的顶峰，黑格尔发表了《法哲学原理》：作为法律道德与政治的哲学讲演。这本书的最后一个小标题是：世界历史，对于黑格尔来说，它也可以被叫做历史哲学。因为根据他的历史哲学讲演，“历史哲学不是别的，就是对于历史观察的反思”。  在康德“哲学学科与法学学科的冲突”这一部分，康德区分了三种人类历史具有代表性的形式。三种都被驳斥了，分别是持续地向着更恶倒退，不断地向着更善进步以及在进步与退步之间不停地交替。代替这三种认识的观点是他的一种对人类历史预测的描述：它允许世界共和国的预期的发展作为人性自私（这也是很危险的）的结果而存在，这是作为对法国大革命的旁观而得出的认识。在黑格尔这里，黑格尔在介绍部分强调了三种接近历史的方式（这实际上在他的《法哲学原理》里面内容里是没有的）。但是，黑格尔强调的三种方式和康德并不是没有关系。黑格尔前两种方式与经验的、实证的历史有关（康德对于一些也知道，但是并不是黑格尔式地思考方式），作为结果，黑格尔很重视它们。更明显的是，黑格尔的三种方式并不像康德一样是不合法的，相反，它们三种方式都是合法的。此外，对于黑格尔每一种方式都呈现为精神发展的一个阶段。康德对于经验与哲学的区分给予一种内部的源泉使得它们依然作为黑格尔《精神现象学》的一个阶段，所以它们也保留在作为现象的历史精神里。  黑格尔第一种进入历史的方式是希罗多德或修昔底徳式的原始的历史，他使得外在的现象转化为精神的观念（《历史哲学》11）。他的作者“把飘忽的片段联系在一起，然后把它们宝藏在泥摩息尼神庙之中，使它们不朽”（12）。第二种方式，即反省的历史，延伸到超过“对精神而言是现实的”——作为一种汇编，它从事对于史料的评价，这样的评价基于它的真理性，是否可信以及作为基于历史的普遍方面，像艺术、法律、宗教。第三种是哲学的历史。它无非是历史地反思性考察。然而，它与一个单一的、先天的思想有关，即“理性掌管着世界，世界历史无非被人理性地认知”。根据黑格尔，“理性不是如此软弱，以至于它仅仅产生一些立足于应该的理念”。    因为对于应该的讨论全部属于黑格尔对于康德的批判，每个人都可以猜想这里有着对于康德无声的批判。然而，如果这就是黑格尔对于康德的批判，那么这些批判并不合适。世界历史变得更加理性，在人类历史里有着人的全部理性能力的提高（为了达到这一目的，这里有着朝向合法性的道德，合法的关系以及世界性的世界公民的进步），这完全是康德历史哲学的中心思想，上面提到的这些作为康德历史哲学的基本内容存在于康德的文本，《理念》中。  除了分享康德在世界历史中理性的角色外，这里有第二方面的共同性。黑格尔和康德都把历史哲学归于专业哲学。黑格尔和康德的第三个共同点是成体系性。虽然康德并不是像黑格尔一样把他的历史哲学归于法哲学，康德的理念有他的特色，他使得他的自由的哲学独立于法。除此之外，康德把他的历史哲学延伸到《论通常的说法：这在理论上可能是正确的，但在实践上是行不通的》的第三部分致力于讨论国际法的部分，更进一步，在《永久和平论》，尤其是在他的《学科之争》（例如，在第三篇文章里，直接讨论到哲学与法学的争执）。  黑格尔把他的历史哲学置于《法哲学原理》的突出地位，即结论部分。通过放置在这里，黑格尔建构了不断强化的（否定）的最终峰，它是与辩证法相契合的。更进一步的审查，虽然这个结论是一个奇怪的顶峰：在《法哲学原理》里面，这一部分呈现了自在自为的自由意志的理念一步步达到顶峰的过程：它开始于抽象意志的抽象法，然后从事于反思的意志（道德），最后达到对于两者的综合，即它们的真理部分的伦理。就“伦理”的发展过程而言，从作为自然精神的“家庭”，到了表示分裂环节的“市民社会”，达到作为客观的自由体现的国家。然而，在这一阶段，它们达到了对立的顶峰，而不是真正的顶峰。这是因为可供选择的自由意志已经早已在第一阶段（即国家法）中就实现了。在第二个阶段（即国际法），相反，伦理完全改变了。然而，在最后阶段，与康德相反，黑格尔投身于世界历史，而不是具有世界性的世界公民，这使得最后一节与自由意志相矛盾。  我们的哲学家黑格尔忠实于他的辩证法。世界历史是国家法与国家法的综合。这是因为“在世界历史里，精神现实性达到了它的完全内在性和外在性”（《原理》&341）。这无疑达到了更进一步的发展，甚至达到了完美，然而，有着否定性，有着高峰突降的时候，有着主体性不断扩大，这就表明它还不是明确理性的法院。相反，在他的《历史哲学》（35）里面，他表达了“世界历史是屠场……在其中，幸福的人民，智慧的国家以及个人的美德都被带向了死亡”。但是尽管如此，黑格尔依然坚持普遍理性高于个别的任性（部分的人民，国家与个人），作为结果，历史可以被它的内在理性法则所决定，它的内在必然性可以被哲学所认识。但是它不可以被主体所推进，就像康德所做的那样（见《观念》27页，七卷）。    法哲学使得一个人把世界历史看作“屠宰场”而不是（像康德一样）最高的政治之善（永久和平），这并不会博得黑格尔的同情。从今天的视角来看，占统治地位的普遍法权伦理对人性的反思，从越来越多的国际间的关系，康德更显得更高明些。黑格尔拒绝永久和平这一概念（《法哲学》&333A）。他宣称战争对于人们伦理的健康是必不可少的（&324A)。当谈到国际关系的时候，他很满足于国际法，它不仅仅不承认合法的（就像康德在《永久和平》&354处，而不是在《观念》的命题七里）世界秩序，而且黑格尔自身不承认适度的基本的国家联盟。  然而，当谈到历史哲学，黑格尔分享着和康德基本一样的启蒙观念。首先，他也认为历史是一个普遍的历史而且是作为进步的历史。在这一方面，尽管他和康德（与热情的支持启蒙相反）他们都并不预设一个普遍的进程，但是集中于自由和理性的进步——毕竟就它们都是合法的理性而言）。最后对于康德，对于黑格尔也一样，构想进步大部分来源于受益者所不未知的方面。  对于亚当斯密而言的在经济生活中有看不见的手，这在康德那里成了“隐蔽的自然”（《观念》17）。一个人可以把它看作人类本性的狡计，因为这样的自然（作为非社会的社会性的对立）带来了合法的进步。对于康德仅仅描述的，黑格尔贴上了这样的标签，明确地把它叫做理性的狡计（《历史哲学》序言）；此外（与康德一致），他谈到了“神意与神意的计划”，它也是“不可知的，并且不可掌握的”（原理343A）。    为了使进步实现，根据黑格尔，天意或理性提供两个主体。都是“世界历史个体”和“国家精神”（这意味着人们组织它们的法律和宪法的方式）。并不是通过自由意志而拯救理性，而是通过个人的特殊兴趣（其中一个还保留着康德有视见的个人兴趣）。当黑格尔说到世界精神，他并不是在说一些神秘的力量，而是完全的伦理世界的人性。然而康德（最清楚的在他的《学科之争》）增加了个人的责任，拥有自由的  人可以而且应该是向着更好社会的发起者。黑格尔以如下的方式结束了他的历史哲学，即以四个“世界历史皇帝”构成的辩证解释句子：东方人、希腊人、罗马人以及德国人的皇帝。在他把历史看作屠宰场这样一个视角下，这很有必要不以当代的眼光以及（对于黑格尔是未知的）两次世界大战，原子弹的使用，犹太大屠杀以及在20、21世纪出现的残忍的非法政体这些来看黑格尔。黑格尔以数百年甚至数千年的历史跨度来看待世界历史皇帝。  这同样是是黑格尔在“世界历史”更小部分做出的评价，这同样适用于上面的原则。东方的皇帝并不满足黑格尔设定的初步阶段的标准，“国际法”。这是由于国家宪法和合法宗教的混合，而且由于个体私人没有权利，甚至有组织性的状况，作为黑格尔第一个原理（例如抽象法）都是完全没有适当的完成。作为全部的事件，当谈到黑格尔的第四阶段，国家阶段，精神接受“它的真理和它的具体本质于其内心”（&352）。这是因为国家发展自身到“理性的形象和现实”（&360）。    康德和黑格尔进一步共享了，特殊的个体只有通过普遍的“人类教育”（&343A)而得到实现。那么个体的差异在哪里？黑格尔依然是普遍主义的捍卫者。他把他的普遍主义立足于公民社会阻碍了普遍主义以及人类的责任心。黑格尔知道，当然，法国大革命的成就（就人类以及公民权利而言）（见&209）。他把他们置于经济的而不是政治的秩序中。既不是在国家法也不是在世界历史中他们发现了合法的哲学和平。其中一个原因是黑格尔狭隘的世界主义，他在人类权利的同一段落中说它“位于具体国家生活的对立面”。  确切地说，黑格尔主义并不会谈到狭隘的世界主义而是会要求更好的现实感，因为黑格尔认识到，现实就像它现在所是，也许将来也是这样，这个国家，谁嫉妒另外一个国家的主权，会永远不会接受到由合法的世界秩序而来的对于它们国家主权的严格限制。前一小部分对现实的判断是正确的。在黑格尔时期，没有放弃国家主权，而且没有人会预测它。然而，在今天事情已经有所改变，无论它是否是一种明确的表达或者它仅仅是对主权无声的放弃——类似主权职能已经通过国内的、超级国家政府、组织、国际法被普遍地假定。即是说，他们指定合法的任务是通过（超越主权）制定的政策而被执行的。一部分人考虑到它的主权的顺从（例如，他假定了权威的领导者），在一些地方，甚至存在专制政府，而在一些地方已经有了世界法庭。当一个人考虑了上面的一切，这里早已经有了这样的迹象：即作为“温和”的政治权力的形式（例如作为“温和的合法性”“温和的执行权力”以及“温和的司法权力”），同时合法的世界秩序已经被准备好了。尤其，一个人可以想想欧盟以及联合国。  意识到黑格尔和今天时代的差别，一个人可以质疑黑格尔后一半部分所说的更强的实在论。在今天，我们经历到开始准备去接受较小的主权限制，这使得我们很难放弃在未来接受更大的主权限制。 |